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From the editors: In 2021, Not Even Past launched a new collaboration with LLILAS
Benson. Journey into the Archive: History from the Benson Latin American Collection
celebrates the Benson’s centennial and highlights the center’s world-class holdings.
by Gabrielle Esparza
In April 1985, the historic trial of the military juntas that had ruled Argentina from 1976
to 1982 began in Buenos Aires. Nine members of three previous military juntas faced
charges ranging from the falsi cation of public documents to homicide. Over the
following eight months, the trial of the juntas captured national attention. Although not
televised or aired by radio, the trial was open to the public and received detailed
coverage in El Diario del Juicio, a weekly publication that documented the proceedings
and included witness transcripts. The accessibility and publication of the facts
surrounding the prosecution helped convert the trial into a national event, which served
not only to punish the guilty but also to help create a shared understanding of the past.
At the Benson Latin American Collection, case transcripts of testimonies given by 828
witnesses at the 1985 trial occupy 10 boxes and more than 7,000 pages. The Actas
Mecanogra adas document gross human rights violations and present damning
evidence against senior military commanders, including former heads-of-state. Some
feared that political or social changes would place the trial transcripts in jeopardy. As a
safeguard against destruction and to ensure long-term preservation of these records,
Argentine o cials made efforts to deliver copies of trial transcripts and recordings to
foreign archives.
Witnesses recounted dramatic details of torture and abuse, and their testimony served
as Federal Prosecutor Julio Strassera’s most powerful tool during the trial of the juntas.
Hundreds of similar accounts helped the prosecution establish a pattern of repressive
state-sponsored violence. After leaving power in 1983, the armed forces had maintained
that any unjust or innocent deaths were the result of errors or excesses committed by
individual o cers. Strassera’s case selection sought to disprove this defense by
demonstrating that a sustained pattern of abduction, torture, and murder occurred
countrywide. Documenting similarities across numerous military commands, Strassera
argued that former leaders had established an apparatus of state terror and could not
attribute the violence to a few renegade o cers.
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The military commanders on trial were Rafael Videla, Emilio Massera, Orlando
Agosti, Roberto Viola, Omar Gra gna, Armando Lambruschini, Leopoldo Galtieri,
Basilio Lami Dozo and Jorge Anaya. Source: Agencia EFE
Witness testimony helped establish the facts of the 709 cases and detailed a systematic
pattern of repressive practices, but the prosecution needed to prove a legal basis for
punishment of the ex-leaders. Members of the three juntas did not directly engage in or
supervise the described atrocities. However, they had issued the instructions calling for
the annihilation of subversion. In the context of state-sanctioned violence, Strassera
reasoned that the ex-leaders were indirect authors of the crimes committed because
they exercised complete control of the repressive apparatus and over their direct agents
or subordinates who engaged in the actual violence.[1]
The prosecution sought to demonstrate that the generals held responsibility for the
actions of their subordinates due to the structure and culture of the armed forces.
Within the military, the top brass could remove and replace anyone for noncompliance.
Thus, the individual was interchangeable, and the crime would likely occur with or
without that person’s participation. Furthermore, the armed forces encouraged total
con dence in one’s superiors. Retired Navy O cer Adolfo Scilingo, who would gain fame
in the 1990s as the  rst man to break the military’s pact of silence, explained, “In the
navy, there’s no such thing as orders that aren’t legal.”[2] Scilingo’s account detailed a
military institution that expected blind obedience and discouraged individual
assessment of an order’s legitimacy.
The testimony of military o cers during the trial helped the prosecution establish the
unique context in which human rights violations occurred. First Lieutenant Ernesto
Facundo Urien detailed how the hierarchical structure of the armed forces encouraged
compliance because those who expressed differing opinions risked their career.[3]
During his testimony, Urien recalled various incidents that led him to doubt the military’s
methods in the so-called “war on subversion.” Superiors had ordered Urien to dress as a
civilian, with his military arms, and patrol public spaces. He also provided security during
transfers of personnel and prisoners to La Perla military installation, which served as a
clandestine detention center during the dictatorship. At La Perla, Urien witnessed a
detainee, “hooded, hands and feet bound.”[4] Urien questioned these tactics, but
superiors defended their actions within the context of a civil war. Ultimately, Urien was
forced into retirement in 1980 for “not sharing the philosophies that the institution
upheld.”[5]
Ernesto Facundo Urien on the cover of el diario del juicio just days after his
testimony.
Fear of repercussions for speaking out extended beyond professional concerns. “The
climate that existed was don’t risk frank opinions,” testi ed Captain Félix Roberto
Bussico, “There inside, life had no value . . . regardless of the life involved.”[6] An o cer
could refuse to comply with orders, but the repressive apparatus bred fear of retaliation
and limited subordinates’ decision-making capacity. Bussico’s testimony and those of
other military o cers demonstrated that a minority of lower-ranking o cers did not
devise the violent tactics of the preceding years. Instead, orders for torture and
disappearance derived from the highest ranks and bred a culture of indiscriminate
violence.
As evidence mounted against the military leaders on trial, the defense sought to justify
the armed forces’ violent methods in the context of a brutal civil war. The accused
believed that the trial punished them for acts of service to the nation. “He who saves the
nation does not break any law,” asserted the defense counsel for Lami Dozo, air force
general and member of the third junta.[7] The defendants understood their actions
within the context of an ideological war, so they believed defeating subversion justi ed
their methods and absolved them of criminal responsibility. Following this reasoning, the
defense frequently resorted to attacks on the witness’s or alleged victim’s character.
This strategy often back red. After an aggressive line of questioning, Magdalena Ruiz
Guiñazú, a journalist and member of the National Commission on the Disappearance of
Persons, replied with her own question. “Is it lawful,” she asked, “to torture, kill, and make
people disappear?”[8] Guiñazú’s retort highlighted the criminality of the defendants’















Issuing its  nal verdict in December 1985, the Federal Court of Appeals rejected the
defense’s arguments. The chamber responded that the defendants’ actions were
abusive. “There was no intensi cation of originally adequate means but rather illicit
instruments,” explained the judges.[9] They held that “combat should never escape the
framework of the law.”[10] The sentencing further clari ed that the military juntas had
access to legal measures to combat so-called subversives. According to the members
of the Federal Court of Appeals, the dictatorship could have declared emergency zones,
dictated public warnings, made summary judgements, and even applied death
sentences.[11] The former leaders had not employed these methods.
In its entirety, the judgement  lled 868 pages. The judges sentenced General Jorge
Videla and Admiral Eduardo Massera to life in prison; General Roberto Viola to seventeen
years in prison; Admiral Armando Lambrushini to eight years in prison; and Brigadier
General Osvaldo Agosti to four and one-half years in prison. The sentencing also
stripped them of their military status. Those acquitted were the second junta’s Brigadier
General Omar Gra gna, and the three leaders of the third junta, General Leopoldo
Galtieri, Admiral Jorge Anaya, and Brigadier General Lami Dozo.[12] Members of the
second and third juntas generally received lower sentences because more than eighty
percent of the kidnappings occurred during the  rst two years of the dictatorship.[13]
The verdict generated con icting reactions from the public. Particularly for those who
had suffered personally, the sentencing seemed far too lenient. Emilio Mignone, who
became a prominent human rights activist after his daughter disappeared in 1976,
maintained that “the sentencing [did] not satisfy the expectations of a democratic
society.”[14] Others claimed the trial was nothing more than a political show. However,
the trial had respected legal codes and due process. Strict adherence to the law during
the trial of the military generals showed the power of democratic processes to condemn
illegal acts, even when done by former leaders. This was an important act in a country
prone to military intervention and the  rst step in establishing greater civilian control
over the armed forces.
The trial and resulting records document gross violations of human rights. O cial
estimates place the number of disappeared between 10,000 and 30,000, among them
more than 500 babies and children. Witness testimony and evidence helped prove that
these disappearances occurred as part of an apparatus of state-sanctioned terror. More
importantly, the testimony also demonstrated that the military commanders had
orchestrated the violence and deserved punishment. This was clear even to those
sectors of Argentine society that had supported the dictatorship. The trial, which
occurred within the framework of democratic laws and institutions, publicly and o cially
condemned the military dictatorship.
Today, the transcripts housed in the Benson Latin American Collection serve as an
archive of Argentina’s early efforts to reckon with its legacy of state-sponsored violence.
More than thirty years later, such efforts continue in the form of new and ongoing trials
for human rights abuses committed during the dictatorship. The trials, and the crimes
they describe, are shocking. But, as disturbing as the details are, we are fortunate to
have access to such a collection. The Actas Mecanogra adas bear witness to a di cult
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